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CASE NO, 
13798 
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 
' STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit by a broker - First Equity Corpora-
tion - against its customer - Utah State University - and 
against the University's employee - Donald A. Catron - for 
losses from the sale of stock the customer failed to pay for 
and for commissions. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On cross motions for summary judgment under Rule 56, 
the University's motion was granted and First Equity's motion 
was denied. First Equity appealed from the granting of the 
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University's Motion for Summary Judgment and the denial of 
its Motion for Summary Judgment. :;'••* 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
First Equity and Amici Curiae seek reversal of both 
Summary Judgments and remand of the case for further proceed-
ings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 20, 1972, the Institutional Council of 
Utah State University authorized defendant Dona."id Ac Catron 
by a formal corporate resolution to buy and sell common stock 
with any nationally recognized brokerage house (R, 151}. 
The resolution provided: 
BE IT RESOLVED: That this corporation ia autho-
rized and empowered to open and maintain an 
account with any broker who is a member of any 
of the major security exchanges or the National 
Association of Security Dealers for the pur-
chase, trade, and sell, long or short, transfer, 
and assign, stocks, bonds, and securities of 
every nature on margin or otherwise, and that 
any of the officers hereinafter named be, and 
hereby is, authorized to give written or verbal, 
instructions to the brokers concerning the here-
in named transactions * * * (R. 137). 
Donald A. Catron and D* A* Broadbent, were designated 
as the officers empowered to open and maintain such accounts 
(R. 137). Mr. Catron was Controller and Assistant Vice-Presi-
dent of Finance of the University at the time (R. 137)* The 
resolution provided further that it would remain in full force 
and effect until written notice of revocation was delivered 
to each broker acting for the University (R. 137). 
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In October, 19 72, pursuant to the resolution, Mr* Catron 
opened an account with First Equity, a member of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers. Between October, 1972 and 
January, 1973, First Equity purchased various stocks for the 
University upon the express direction of Mr. Catron. Upon 
delivery of those stocks, the University paid for them in the 
ordinary course of business (R„ 160-61)* 
On January 17, 1973, Catron directed First Equity to 
purchase 5,000 shares of Advanced Memory Systems for the 
University's account. On January 31, 1973, Catron directed 
First Equity to purchase 24,100 shares of Panelrama and on 
February 28, 1973, 83,800 shares of Great Basin Petroleum, 
55,700 shares of Cordura, and 13,000 shares of Natoma (R. 251). 
In each of these transactions, First Equity was act-
ing as agent for the University (R. 140-49, 247). In each 
of these transactions, Donald A. Catron directed First 
Equity to purchase these stocks for the University (R. 251). 
On March 13, 19 73, First Equity delivered the shares 
of Advanced Memory Systems. The University refused to pay 
for the shares and informed First Equity that it would not 
honor the other purchases of January 31 and February 28, 
1973 (R. 247, 251). 
That refusal was the first suggestion received by 
First Equity that Catron or the University may not have had 
authority to purchase the stocks (R. 247-48). 
-3-
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All of the purchases by the University through First 
Equity involved in this case occurred after the University 
claims to have revoked Catron's authority and after the Univer-
sity received notice from the Attorney General's Office that 
there may have been a question concerning the University's 
power to invest in common stocks, at least as to some of its 
funds (R. 153). 
Despite this knowledge, the University failed to give 
any notice to plaintiff until March, 1973 (R. 160-61)* This 
failure to give notice occurred even though First Equity had 
been regularly purchasing stocks for the University since 
October, 1972, when Catron admittedly had express authority to 
place orders for the purchase of stock and the University had 
paid for such stock in the regular course of business (R, 358)c 
Upon the University's refusal to pay for the shares 
delivered on March 13, 1973, First Equity filed a Complaint 
in the District Court of Cache Countyf Utah, against the 
University and Catron for the loss on resale of Advanced 
Memory Systems and for commissions on the purchase on January 
31, and February 28. Motions for Summary Judgment were made 
by both First Equity and the University based on the allega-
tions' of the Complaint (R. 238, 433). The University's motion 
was limited to its First Affirmative Defense, i.e., that the 
Complaint failed to state a claim because the University was 
not authorized to invest in common stocks (R. 4 33). No motion 
was filed as to Catron. 
-4-
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After oral argument, First Equity's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was denied and the University's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was granted on the ground that (1) Utah Code Anno-
tated, Sections 33-1-1 and 33-1-3, provide what investments 
may be made by a public corporation or political or public 
body and (2) First Equity could not recover damages where it 
did not deliver the securities purchased within the time 
period provided in Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board 
(R. 258-59). 
Summary Judgment was granted in favor of the Univer-
sity despite the undisputed fact that Catron had received 
written authorization to purchase common stock from the 
Institutional Council of the University? that he had been 
exercising this authority over a period of months? that 
First Equity had been regularly dealing with Catron for 
several months; that the University did not inform First 
Equity at any time that Catron's authority or that the 
powers of the University were restricted in any way, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED BECAUSE EVEN ASSUMING, 
ARGUENDO, THAT THE UNIVERSITY ACTED ULTRA VIRES, 
FIRST EQUITY IS NOT BARRED FROM RELIEF, 
Even assuming, arguendo, contrary to the law (see 
Points III and IV, infra), that the University was without 
power to purchase common stocks, it does not follow that 
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First Equity is barred from recovering its commissions and 
losses incurred while acting as agent for the University. 
In all of the transactions mentioned in the Complaint, 
First Equity was acting only as the agent of the University 
(R. 140-49). All of the orders placed by Catron were un-
solicited (R. 140-49). First Equity faithfully carried out 
the instructions of its principal in each of the subject 
transactions. It follows, for the reasons stated below, 
that whether or not the University had the "power** to engage 
in these transactions was not relevant to the issues resolved 
by the trial court. 
While acting as the University.1 s .agent in these trans-
actions, First Equity's only duty to the University was "to 
obey the instructions of his principal and exercise ;fn his 
employment reasonable skill and ordinary diligence,11 ^t^te 
Automobile & Casualty Underwriters v. Salisbury, 27 U. 2d 229 , 
494 P.2d 529, 531 (1972). 
There is nothing in the record which even suggests that 
First Equity breached that duty. On the contrary, First Equity 
would have breached its duty if it had failed to follow 
Catron1s instructions to execute the unsolicited orders placed 
by him. First Equity has fulfilled its duty to the University 
and is entitled to compensation for the services performed in 
the fulfillment of that duty. 
The Utah Supreme Court in McCollum v. Clothier, 121 
Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468 (1952), said: 
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The question of moment, then, is as to the 
authorization of this work. The rule appli-
cable to this situation is contained in the 
Restatement of Agency, Vol. 2, Sec. 441: 
"Except for the relationship of the parties, 
the triviality of the services, or other 
circumstances indicate that the parties have 
agreed otherwise, it is inferred that one 
who requests or permits another to perform 
services for him as his agent promises to 
pay for them." [241 P.2d 470.] 
And, as to the loss on the sale by First Equity of 
the Advanced Memory Systems stock after the University refused 
to pay for it, First Equity is entitled to be indemnified by 
the University. 
The agent's right of indemnity always in-
cludes a right to reimbursement for amounts 
properly paid for losses suffered without his 
fault in transactions authorized by the princi-
pal. [Restatement (2nd) of Agencyf Explana-
tory Notes, Section 4 38, Comment B 324 (May 23, 
1957)]. 
The University relies upon a general rule that a per-
son dealing with a governmental entity acts at his peril with 
respect to the powers of that entity. Assuming, arguendo, 
that such a general rule would have application to the other 
party to an executory contract, it can have no application 
whatsoever to a person who acts as the agent of the govern-
mental entity. Were the law otherwise, every employee of 
every public corporation in this state would incur personal 
liability for any act purportedly taken on behalf of the 
public corporation which exceeded the powers of that corpo-
ration even though the act was ordered and directed by the 
employer. The duties of First Equity do not change because 
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the University is a public corporation even if acting ultra 
vires in investing in common stocks. 
The defense of ultra vires is available only as a 
shield against the other party to the ultra vires contract. 
It cannot be used as a sword against one's own agent who has 
acted faithfully in the execution of its principalfs orders, 
and without negligence or lack of due diligence. 
The University cites no case which stands for the pro-
position that the defense of ultra vires by a municipal cor-
poration can be used against its own agent in a suit brought 
by that agent for compensation for services already rendered 
and for losses incurred in the performance of the agent's 
duties to that principal. 
The law is to the contrary. An agent can recover for 
the value of his services and for losses incurred xn the per-
formance of his duties to the principal if the agent has 
acted in good faith and with due diligence. Recovery can be 
had even if the contract entered into by the agent for the 
principal is voidable or even tortious. Restatement (2nd) 
of Agency, Section 439, 457 (1957) stalest 
Unless otherwise agreed, a principal is sub-
ject to a duty to exonerate an agent who is 
not barred by the illegality of his conduct 
to indemnify him for: 
(a) authorized payments made by the agent 
on behalf of the principal; 
(b) payments upon contracts upon which 
the agent is authorized to make himself liable, 
and upon obligations arising from the posses-
sion or ownership of things which he is autho-
rized to hold on account of the principal; 
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(c) payments of damages to third persons 
which he is required to make on account of the 
authorized performance of an act which consti-
tutes a tort or a breach of contract . • . 
•k -k -k -k ic 
A principal for whom an agent has performed 
services in accordance with a voidable con-
tract which is avoided by one of the parties, 
or for whom an agent or purported agent has 
performed services without a promise by the 
principal to pay, is subject to liability to 
the agent to the extent that he has been un-
justly enriched by such services. 
The rules of the Restatement were applied in the 
Utah Supreme Court case of Hoggan v.Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 
73 P. 542 (1903). There suit was brought by an agent who 
had committed the tort of conversion without knowledge of 
the wrong while taking property on behalf of his principal 
and at the direction of his principal. The Court allowed 
recovery stating: 
[0]n the other hand, where the agent acts 
innocently and without notice of the wrong, 
the law will imply a promise on the part of 
the principal to indemnify him. The same 
doctrine applies to all other cases of losses 
or damages sustained by an agent in the course 
of the business of his agency, if they are 
incurred without any negligence or default on 
his own part. [73 P. 514] 
Even if the contracts complained of were ultra vires, 
which they were not, that defense can be asserted by the 
University only against the other party to the contract. 
First Equity performed its agency with due diligence and is 
entitled to its compensation for services rendered and to 
indemnity against loss incurred in the performance of that 
agency. 
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The ultra vires argument, as made by the University, 
is simplistic. It does not follow from the fact, if it be 
a fact, that an act, ultra vires for one purpose, is ultra 
vires for all purposes. Nor is it true that ultra vires 
contracts cannot support a claim for relief* 
Finally, even if it is assumed, arguendo, that the 
University is akin to a municipal corporation which acted 
ultra vires and First Equity's status as agent is not rele-
vant^ it still does not follow that First Equity is barred 
from recoverys there being no specific* statutory prohibitions 
against the University's investing in-common stocks. 
In Baker Lumber Co. v. A, A. Clark, et al, 53 Utah 3 36, 
178 Pc 764 (1919), the Utah Supreme Court drew a distinction 
between contracts entered into by inunicipai corporations which 
were specifically prohibited by law and contracts which were 
merely beyond the power of the municipality to ma e. In 
Baker, the Utah Supreme Court held that a school district 
was obligated to pay interest on warrants in accordance with 
its contract with a school builder despite the fact that the 
original issuance of warrants was not expressly authorized. 
The Court stated: 
There is no express provision in the statutes 
of this state authorizing school boards or other 
public corporations to"issue interest-bearing 
warrants. There is a provision relating to 
interest on school bonds issued after authority 
obtained from the qualified electors of the 
several school districts, and the rate of inter-
est for such indebtedness is that the bonds so 
issued shall bear interest not exceeding five 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
per cent per annum, payable annually or 
semi-annually. Manifestly that provision 
of the statute does not relate to and does 
not govern where the facts are as in this 
case. It is further contended that the great 
weight of authority, in the absence of 
express statutory provisions, is that war-
rants issued by public corporations do not 
bear interest. 
•k -k -k -k -k 
In this action, as indicated, the debt 
was due at the time the building was accepted. 
The school board was authorized to contract 
to pay the debt at that date. We are unable 
to understand why a public corporation should 
not be required to meet its obligations the 
"same as any other body authorized to contract 
debts, and upon a failure to make payment at 
the time agreed why it should not be required 
to pay interest for any forbearance as an 
individual. Moreover, this court has recog-
nized that a public corporation, where it had 
received the benefit of goods, should pay the 
legal rate from the date it received the bene-
fit of its contract. [Emphasis added; 53 Utah 
350] . 
Why in this case should the University be permitted 
to speculate in the stock market and pass its losses on to 
its own broker? Why should it not meet its obligations the 
same as any other investor? 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED BECAUSE THE UNIVERSITY 
IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THAT THE CONTRACTS 
COMPLAINED OF WERE ULTRA VIRES. 
The University is equitably estopped to deny that it 
lacks power or authority to enter into the transactions com-
plained of. As the United States Supreme Court has succinctly 
stated: 
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[T]he principles of right and justice, 
upon which the doctrine of estoppel in pais 
rests, are applicable to municipal corpora-
tions . . . [Beadles v. Smyser, 209 U.S. 393, 
402 (1908)]. 
Application of the principle of estoppel is the same 
against municipalities or public corporations as against indivi-
duals or private corporations: 
The doctrine of estoppel is generally 
applied against local governments, so as to 
prevent them from denying their contracts, 
under the same general rules governing indi-
viduals and private corporation?* [1 A 
Antieaur Municipal Corporation Law, Section 
10.10 (1973)]„ 
The principle of estoppel applied to municipal corpo-
rations has been consistently recognized in Utah, Tooele 
City v. Elkington,lQ0 Utah 485, 116 P,2d 406 (1941). 
The elements giving rise to an estoppel a.r^  stated in 
Migliaccio v. Davis, 120 Utah 1, 7, 232 P.2d 195, 198 (1951) 
as follows: 
[1] The general rule of equitable estoppel 
is set forth in the following language in .19 
Am Jur., page 634, Sec. 34: '* * * Equitable 
estoppel or estoppel in pais is the principle 
by which a party who knows or should know the 
truth is absolutely precluded, both at law and 
in equity, from denying or asserting the contrary 
of, any material fact, which, by his words or 
conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally 
or through culpable negligence, he has induced 
another, who was excusably ignorant of the true 
facts and who had a right to rely upon such 
words and conduct, to believe and act upon them 
thereby, as a consequence reasonably to be anti-
cipated, changing his position in such a way 
that he would suffer injury if such denial or 
contrary assertion were allowed. 
-1 9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Every element listed in Migliaccio is present in 
this case. The University, on January 20, 1972, adopted 
a corporate resolution authorizing Catron to purchase 
common stocks with any nationally recognized brokerage 
house. The University held Catron out as its authorized 
agent in that resolution to purchase and order such stocks 
(R. 160-61). 
From October, 1972, to December, 1972, First Equity 
in the regular course of business, delivered stock and the 
University paid for it. In March, 1973, the University 
abruptly and inconsistently changed its position by assert-
ing that it never had the power or authority to purchase 
the stocks in the first place. First Equity, in reliance 
upon the University's actions, changed its position to its 
injury by executing orders for the purchase of stock on be-
half of the University and for its account. 
On December 15, 1972, prior to the transactions in 
question, the University was placed on notice by the Attor-
ney General's Office that there might be a question concern-
ing the University's power to purchase common stock (R. 153). 
The University did not notify First Equity of this question 
until three months later, after the contracts complained of 
had been entered into (R. 160-61). First Equity was without 
notice of any question concerning the corporate resolution 
until after all of the transactions had been entered into. 
The facts here are similar to those in the Utah 
Supreme Court decision of Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 
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593 (1917) , and for this reason should compel the same 
result. In Wall the City of Salt Lake was estopped from 
claiming ownership of certain real property after the 
plaintiff who occupied the land had purchased it upon 
reliance of a formal resolution of the City Council that 
the property was private and after plaintiff had paid pro-
perty taxes upon the same assessed by the City. Because the 
court held that the City was so estopped/ it did not bother 
to inquire whether the City did in fact have proper title 
to the property. 
Based upon the foregoingf the doctrine of estoppel 
in pais should be applied to this case and the oriers of the 
trial court should be vacated. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE UNIVERSITY'S 
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE""A 
GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT HAD"NOT BEEN RESOLVED, 
The Court below found in paragraph 2 of its Order Deny-
ing First Equity's motion for summary judgment (R. 435B)
 f 
entered simultaneously with its Order granting the University's 
motion, that: 
There is at least a triable issue of fact 
whether USU, at the time Catron ordered the 
stock in question or the time payment for said 
stock fell due, had funds which it had receiv-
ed from individual grants or development con-
tracts sufficient to pay for part or all of 
said stock • . 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
pertinent part: 
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The [summary] judgment sought shall be render-
ed forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
[emphasis added] 
Because the Record on Appeal discloses that there 
was a genuine issue as to whether non-appropriated funds 
were available to pay, in whole or in part, for the 
stocks ordered by the University, the Court's granting of 
the University's motion for summary judgment was erroneous* 
This is true without regard to the propriety of the trial 
court's additional finding that the University may not invest 
appropriated funds in common stocks. Accordingly, the order 
granting such motion should be vacated and the matter remanded 
to the Court below for further proceedings. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE UNIVERSITY'S 
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE 
UNIVERSITY HAD THE POWER TO INVEST STATE 
APPROPRIATED MONIES IN ITS POSSESSION IN 
COMMON STOCKS. 
The Trial Court further erred in holding that the 
University did not have power to invest appropriated funds 
in common stocks. 
The Court below grounded its order upon the mistaken 
view that the University had no power to invest State appro-
priated monies in common stocks (R. 435D) and that the 
* 
As noted above, this mistaken view was not relevant to 
the issues resolved by the Trial Court. 
_ 1 C_ 
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executory stock purchase contracts entered into between 
the University and First Equity were thus ultra vires. 
The Court1s action prevented recovery of funds which First 
Equity expended at the direction and on behalf of the Univer-
sity and of the agency commissions which the University had 
agreed to pay for these services. 
Historically, the University has enjoyed broad general 
powers to manage, control and invest its funds. Both Terri-
torial and State legislative provisions granting these broad 
powers to the University are discussed below. 
The University was created by the Territorial Legisla-
ture in 1888. (Comp. Laws of Utah §§1.852, et seq. (1888)} . 
The Act of the Territorial Legislature also created a Board 
of Trustees to govern the University and declared the powers 
and duties of that Board in section 1855 in part as followsz 
The Trustees shall elect one of their number 
a president, and shall appoint a superintendent, 
a secretary and treasurer. Said trustees shall 
take charge of the general interests of the 
institution, and shall have power to enact by-
laws and rules for the regulation of all its 
concerns, not inconsistent with the laws of 
the Territory. They shall have the general 
control and supervision . * «. of all appropria-
tions made by the Territory for the support of 
the same . . . [Emphasis added] 
It is evident that the grant of "general control and 
supervision . . •. of all appropriations • . .fl [emphasis added] 
was meant to give the University substantial independence and 
autonomy in handling State appropriations. The foregoing 
language was amended in 1929 by the Utah State Legislature in 
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Section 15, Chapter 41, Laws of Utah (1929), when the State 
Legislature restructured the University in certain respects 
not pertinent here. The new language provided in part: 
The Board [of Trustees] shall have the general 
control and supervision . . . of all appro-
priations made by the State of Utah or by Acts 
of congress for the support of the same, and 
also of lands or personal property that may 
be hereafter donated by the State, or by the 
United States, or by any person or corpora-
tion. [Emphasis added] 
The foregoing language is even more comprehensive than the 
original 1888 language, taking into account non-appropriated 
as well as appropriated monies. The 1929 language was not 
repealed by the Utah Legislature until 19 69, when the Higher 
Education Act of 1969 (Utah Code Ann. §§53-48-1 (1953), et. 
seq.) was adopted. 
The 1969 Act generally provided for the reorganiza-
tion of the bodies governing the University (e.g., substi-
tuting the Board of Higher Education for the Board of 
Trustees) but did not alter the broad investment powers of 
the University. Consistent with the broad powers granted to 
the University by the Territorial Legislature in 18 88 and 
again by the State Legislature in 1929, the Utah Legislature 
avoided a specification of how the University should handle 
its finances when it reiterated the University's general 
authority to manage its finances in the 19 69 Act (Utah Code 
Ann. §53-48-10(5) (1953)): 
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Each University and college and the Utah Tech-
nical College at Provo and the Utah Technical 
College at Salt Lake City may do its own pur-
chasing , issue its own payrolls, and handle 
its own financial affairs under the general 
supervision of the board [of Higher Education] 
as provided in this act. [Emphasis added] 
Again, a general, rather than a specific, grant of authority 
is evident. 
It is clear from all of the foregoing that the Univer-
sity has historically enjoyed broad powers, repeatedly given 
it by the Legislature (both Territorial and State)
 F to handle 
its finances from the date of its organization in 18 88 until 
the time of the securities investments giving rise to this 
lawsuit. 
In view of these broad powers, it is unreasonable to 
suppose^ in the absence of specific legislative provisions to 
the contrary, that the University could not invest State appro-
•k 
priated monies in common stocks. And notwithstanding the 
Moreover, if there is some doubt whether the general grants 
of independent financial power to the University included the 
power to invest in common stocks, this issue might be deter-
mined by the factual inquiry of whether the University has 
in fact invested in common stocks over the years, indicating 
that University officials construed the foregoing legislative 
enactments as empowering the University to invest in stocks. 
For this Court has previously held as a rule of statutory 
construction that it is appropriate in Utah, in determining 
the legislative intent of an ambiguous statutory or consti-
tutional provision, to look to the acquiescence and practice 
of those charged with conforming with the terms of the provi-
sion. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 
106, 514 P.2d 217 (1973); and State Board of Education v. 
State Board of Higher Education, 29 Utah 2d 110, 505 P.2d 
1113 (1973). This factual issue, not resolved by the Court 
below, alone would require vacating the order granting the 
University's motion for summary judgment and remanding the 
case for a determination of this factual question. 
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erroneous holding of the Court below to the contrary, 
there was no statutory provision specifically prohibiting 
the University from so investing funds in its possession. 
The Court below incorrectly held that Utah Code 
Ann. §33-1-1 precluded the University from investing State 
appropriated monies in stocks (R. 4 35D). This was error 
because it is apparent from the plain language of the 
statute that the foregoing provision is not enabling in 
nature. It does not prohibit by its terms any investment; 
the section simply authorizes investments in numerous kinds 
of property. This may be seen from the entire text of the 
section which is set forth in the Appendix. 
Section 33-1-1 by its express terms applies with 
equal impact to "any private, political, or public instru-
mentality, body, corporation or person." Hence, if the 
section were deemed to be enabling, it would prohibit any 
person or corporation from purchasing any corporate stock. 
Manifestly, this cannot be so. Section 33-1-1 thus does not 
forbid investment by the University or any other legal 
entity in common stocks. 
Section 33-1-1 is best viewed as neither a grant of 
new authority nor a denial of authority not expressly there-
in given. The provision is simply declarative of the pre-
sumptive legality of certain investments without being 
exclusive. Indeed, Section 33-1-3, in referring to Section 
33-1-1 and other sections, specifically provides in part that: 
-1 Q-
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The provisions of this act are supplemental to 
any and all other laws relating to and declar-
ing what shall be legal investments for the 
persons, corporations . . . referred to in this 
act . . . [Emphasis added] 
Moreover, the Utah Legislature demonstrated that it 
did not regard Section 33-1-1 as enabling when it enacted the 
State Money Management Act on February 2r 1974, which Act 
for the first time made unlawful certain common stock invest-
ments by the University. Chapter 27 Laws of Utah (1974)-j Utah 
Code Ann, §§51-7-1 et seg. (Interim Supp. ' 19 74). . 
The Act is of interest here for several reasons - which 
include: 
1. The Act specifically amends all sections of the 
existing law which are changed by the Act* Conspicuous by 
its absence from those sections of existing laws amended is 
Section 33-1-1. This is consistent with the non-enabling 
interpretation of Section 33-1-1 which is presented herein. 
If the Section were enabling,- it would have been repealed by 
the Money Management Act. 
2. The Act excepts for different treatment in Section 
4(1) (c): 
Funds of member institutions of the state 
system of higher education: (i) acquired by 
gift, devise, or bequest, or by federal or 
private contract or grant; (ii) derived from 
student fees or from income from operations, 
of auxiliary enterprises which fees and income 
are pledged or otherwise dedicated to the pay-
ment of interest and principal of bonds issued 
by such institutions; and (iii) any other funds 
which are not included in the institution's 
work program as approved by the state board 
of higher education. 
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After giving the problem of investments by the 
Universities its serious attention, the Legislature in 
its wisdom elected to apply substantially different rules 
to funds from the named origins. (See Sections 20 and 21). 
Again, there is no reference to an amendment of Section 
33-1-1. 
3. Other University funds are defined as "public 
funds" and are governed by "criteria" described in Section 
19 which authorizes numerous investments not listed in Sec-
tion 33-1-1. Again, this action, without reference to or 
amendment of Section 33-1-1, suggests that the Utah Legi-
slature does not share the views of the Court below as to 
the meaning of 33.-1-1. 
4. Section 2(b) of the Money Management Act states 
as one of the purposes of the Act: 
To establish and maintain a continuing state-
wide policy for the deposit and investment of 
public funds; [Emphasis added] 
This stated purpose is yet another legislative expression 
which does not appear to us to be consistent with the view 
that 33-1-1 is enabling. If the Court below were correct, a 
continuous state-wide policy was already in existence and 
the Legislature would not have needed to establish or main-
tain a new policy. 
For the foregoing reasons, Section 33-1-1 is not 
enabling in nature and thus did not prohibit investment of 
appropriated funds by the University in common stocks at the 
-21-
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time here pertinent. This, combined with the numerous general 
grants of independent financial powers repeatedly bestowed 
upon the University by the Territorial and State Legislature 
in the last 80 years, makes it unreasonable to suppose that 
the University lacked power to invest appropriated funds in 
common stock, prior to 19 74, when the Legislature for the 
first time specifically provided that such investments would 
henceforth be unlawful. It follows that the Court below erred 
and that the order granting summary judgment should be vacated, 
POINT V 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING FIRST EQUITY1^ 
MOTION BECAUSE FIRST EQUITY'S VIOLATION OF REGU-
LATION T DOES NOT "CREATE AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE FOP 
THE UNIVERSITY. 
At the time the Court entered its order granting the 
University1s motion for summary judgment (R. 435D), it also 
entered an order denying First Equity1s motion for summary 
judgment (R. 435A). The Trial Court premised denial of First 
Equity's motion in part upon a legal conclusion that violation by 
First Equity of Regulation T promulgated by the Federal Reserve 
Board (12 CFR'220.4) gave the University an absolute defense 
to First Equity's claims for damages as a matter of law (R. 
435B). Specifically, the Court stated in this connection in 
Regulation T makes it unlawful for a broker-dealer to extend 
credit to a customer beyond certain limits, although the 
Regulation does not expressly provide a customer with a right 
of action or a defense when a broker-dealer violates Regula-
tion T. Regulation T was promulgated pursuant to Section 
7(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USCA 78g(a). 
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its Memorandum Decision (R. 259) that: 
This decision is also based on the fact that 
the plaintiff cannot recover damages where 
it did not deliver the securities purchased 
within the time period provided in Regulation 
T of the Federal Reserve Board . . . [T]he 
court holds and feels that . . . failure to 
deliver within the thirty-five days is a full 
and complete and valid defense in a state 
court to attempt to collect damages. 
The Trial Courtfs view is erroneous; a plaintiff 
broker-dealer's violation of Regulation T does not give 
rise to a complete defense for the defendant customer. The 
Federal cases have held that a cause of action arises 
(and presumably also a defense) only where the customer is 
a small investor, Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co. [Current 
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.R. 1194,760 (S.D. .Calif •; 1974) ? 
Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp,/ 81 F.Supp. 1014 (D* Mass. 
1949) , and when a cause of action does arise it is subject 
to traditional tort defenses, Moscarelli v» Stamm, 288 F. 
Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); and Goldman v. Bank of the 
Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972). 
The University's defense in this connection is 
defeated as a matter of law because (1) the University is 
not a small, but rather a large, sophisticated investor, 
and because (2) the University's violation of Regulation X 
* 
Most cases treating Regulation T issues are Federal deci-
sions because Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
of actions brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 USCA §78(a). State courts only have jurisdic-
tion of Federal Reserve regulation questions when, as 
here, they are raised as a defense. 
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of the Federal Reserve Board (12 CFR 224) rendered it in 
pari delecto to First Equity's violation of Regulation T as 
a matter of law. But, even if this were not so, there would 
be genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Univer-
sity's conduct was in. pari delecto. 
In Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co. [Current Binder] 
CCH Fed. Sec. L.R. 1(94,760 (S.D. Calif. 1974) the plaintiff 
who claimed violations of Regulation T was an active partici-
pant in the stock market who independently researched stocks 
to buy and developed his own investment strategies (similar 
to Catron here.) The court stated that to imply a private 
right of action under these facts "would shock the conscience 
and war with common sense." The court acknowledged the exist-
ence of a legislative intent to protect small investors, the 
"innocent lambs" of the stock market, but no intent to pro-
tect the individual interests of an experienced investor (such 
as the University here.) 
If the University, a sophisticated institutional inves-
tor, were given the defense it asserts, it would fly in the 
face of the dominantly fiscal purpose of Regulation T. Gammage, 
"k 
Regulation X makes it unlawful for a customer to accept 
credit extended by a creditor in violation of Regulation T 
and other Federal Reserve regulations. Regulation X was 
promulgated in 1971 pursuant to Section 7(f) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and no court has yet ruled whether 
a customer's violation of Regulation X renders him in pari 
delecto to a broker-dealer's violation of Regulation T. 
-24-
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supra, at page 96,501. Institutional investors like the 
University would be induced to invest their enormous re-
sources and thereafter participate in activities encourag-
ing and permitting violations of Regulation T with the 
knowledge that if the value of securities purchased declines, 
they may avoid payment as the University is attempting to 
do here. This could only aggravate the very practice Regu-
lation T is designed to prevent, the over-extension of 
credit in the nation's stock markets and the diversion of 
credit into speculative markets away from more desirable 
investments such as commerce and industry. Regulation T 
might be secondarily intended to protect the small investor, 
the "lamb" as characterized in Gammage, supra, but not the 
large institutional investor such as the University. For 
this reason alone, the defense is not available to the Univer-
sity. 
In any case, the University's claimed defense is 
barred by traditional rules applied to the common law of 
torts. In Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 P.Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 
1968) the plaintiff-investor had conspired with a broker in 
H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong. 2nd Sess. 8 (1934) sets forth 
the purpose of the Federal Reserve Regulations: 
The main purpose is to give a Government credit 
agency an effective method of reducing the aggre-
gate amount of the nation's credit resources which 
can be diverted by speculation into the stock mar-
ket and out of other more desirable uses of commerce 
and industry — to prevent a recurrence of the pre-
crash situation where funds which would otherwise 
have been available at normal interest rates for use 
of local commerce, industry and agriculture, were 
drained by far higher rates into security loans and 
the New York call market. [Emphasis added] Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the defendant's employ to violate Federal Reserve regulations. 
The plaintifffs accounts were eventually liquidated at a loss 
to the plaintiff. In exercising the private right of action, 
Moscarelli claimed that the broker's liability for Regulation 
T violations was absolute, regardless of the complicity of 
the investor. In rejecting this argument, the Moscarelli 
court held at pages 459-60 of its opinion: 
It follows that the broker's implied civil lia-
bility 'is not absolute but is subj ect to the 
traditional tort concepts of causation and con-
tributory negligence or analogous conduct. 
In another action, Goldman v. Bank of Commonwealth, 4 67 
F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit reached a similar conclusion. In this case the plain-
tiff obtained loans from the defendant bank in order to pur-
chase stock. The bank made the transactions in violation of 
* 
Regulation U margin requirements. However, the bank had been 
deceived by the plaintiff as to the true purpose of the loans. 
When the plaintiff became unable to repay the loans, he sought 
to have them declared void as being in violation of Regulation 
U. In rejecting the plaintiff!s claim, the court stated at 
page 446: 
The present action is a common law action in 
tort to recover damages for violation of a 
federal statute or regulation. Common law 
defenses are therefore available to the defendant. 
Regulation U, similar to Regulation T, limits the amount of 
credit banks may loan for the purchase of securities. 
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The alleged Regulation T violations upon which 
the University asserts its defense occurred subsequent to 
the effective date of Regulation X in 1971. The Univer-
sity, under its own allegations, clearly violated Section 
7(f) and Regulation X as a matter of law by obtaining, 
receiving and enjoying the use of an unlawful extension 
of credit. Under such circumstances, as a matter of law, 
the University may not raise a defense based upon First 
Equity's alleged violation of Regulation T. If such a 
defense were permitted under the circumstances of this case, 
the whole purpose of Regulation X to restrain illegal credit 
would be defeated. Also, if a borrower who is in pari 
delecto were permitted to avoid liability for its own 
illegal conduct, the legislative intention of Regulation X 
would be negated. 
In view of the very limited circumstances under which 
a Regulation T violation will give rise to a private right 
of action, if at all, we submit that, to state a claim or a 
defense based upon a broker-dealer1s violation of Regulation 
T, the claimant (here, the University) must affirmatively 
establish that its action was not .in pari delecto and was 
not in violation of Regulation X. The University did not 
establish that it was not iri pari delecto because it is 
clear as a matter of law that the University's violation of 
Regulation X rendered it in pari delecto to First Equity's 
violation of Regulation T. And even if First Equity is not 
-9.7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
held to be in pari delecto on this record as a matter of 
law, the issue still remains as one of f&ct. 
The University1s Regulation T defense is without 
merit on this record. The order denying First Equity's 
motion for summary judgment on this ground should be vacated* 
CONCLUSION 
Utah State University, through its Institutional 
Council, authorized Catron to "'purchase, trade, and sell, 
long or short, stocks and securities of every nature on 
margin or otherwise * . .M / A formal corporate resolution so 
providing was adopted on January 20, 1972, 
In January, 19 72, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was 
at a high point and market optimism reigned. Speculative fer-
vor was intense. Some thought Wall Street was a one-way street. 
All thought the market would go higher. It was in this con-
text that the University gave Catron Carte Blanche. 
The market did go higher and reached an all-time high 
in early 19 72. On January 17, 1973 Catron ordered First 
Equity to buy 5,000 shares of Advanced Memory Systems for the 
account of the University. On January 31, Catron ordered 
24,000 shares of Panelrama and on February 28, 83,811 shares 
of Great Basin Petroleum, 55,700 shares of Cordura and 13,000 
shares of Natomas. (R. 251) 
However, it turned out that Catron was behind the market* 
When he refused delivery of the Memory stock, the market had 
fallen drastically. Some purchasers of common stock accepted 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
their losses. Some, as here, sued their brokers. But, to 
succeed in a suit against one's own agent broker, it is 
necessary to show breach of agency duty- None is even 
claimed here. 
There is no claim in this case that Utah State Univer-
sity was promoted, touted or even encouraged to buy common 
stocks by First Equity, to say nothing as to any particular 
common stock. 
First Equity did not tell Catron that treasury bills 
and bonds were for widows and orphans. Catron, himself, made 
the decision for the University that common stocks were more 
suitable for their investment objectives than bills or bonds 
and Catron himself, on behalf of the University, directed 
action by First Equity in each transaction here involved. 
The University cannot avoid liability to its own agent for 
acts which it directed. Its remedies, if any, are against 
other principals in the transactions involved. 
The judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARSONS, BEHLE Sc LATIMER 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
and 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
700 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Amici Curiae 
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APPENDIX 
Set forth below is the complete text of Utah Code 
Ann. §33-1-1 (1953) which the lower Court erroneously 
interpreted as enabling and thus barring the University 
from investing in common stocks* 
33-1-1. Investments in certain securities 
declared lawful. - On and after the passage 
of this act investment by receivers, insurance 
companies of whatever type or nature, build-
ing and loan associations, savings and loan 
associations and other financial institutions, 
charitable, educational, eleemosynary and pub-
lic corporations and organizations, municipali-
ties and other public corporations and bodies, 
mutual assessment insurance companies, mutual 
benevolent and benefit associations; or invest-
ment of funds of any state insurance fund, 
state sinking fund, state school fund, fire-
men's relief and pension fund, police pension 
fund, or other pension fund; or investment by 
any administrative department, board, commis-
sion or officer of the state government, and 
of any county government, authorized by law to 
make investments of funds in the custody or 
under the control of such department, board, 
commissions, or officer, school district or 
township, or the investment by any private, 
political, or public instrumentality, body, 
corporation or person of their own funds or 
funds in their possession in bonds and other 
obligations of or bonds or obligations guaran-
teed as to interest and principal by the United 
States; bonds or debentures issued by any 
federal home loan bank in accordance with the 
provisions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act as 
now or hereafter amended; consolidated federal 
home loan bank bonds or debentures issued by 
the federal home loan bank board in accordance 
with the provisions of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Act as now or hereafter amended; farm 
loan bonds, consolidated farm loan bonds, deben-
tures, consolidated debentures and other obliga-
tions issued by federal land banks and federal 
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intermediate credit banks under the authority 
of the Federal Farm Loan Act approved July 17, 
1916, as now or hereafter amended (Title 12, 
U.S.C. sections 636-1012 and sections 1021-
112 9), and the bonds, debentures, consolidated 
debentures and other obligations issued by banks 
for co-operatives under the authority of the 
Farm Credit Act of 1933, as now or hereafter 
amended (Title 12 U.S.C, sections 1131-1138f); 
bonds or debentures issued by the federal 
savings and loan insurance corporation in accord-
ance with the provisions of Title IV of the 
National Housing Act as nov; or hereafter amended; 
in shares or accounts of building and loan asso-
ciations which have been insured by the federal 
savings and loan insurance corporation and 
shares or accounts of federal savings and loan 
associations incorporated under the provisions 
of the Home Owners1 Loan Act of 19 33 as now or 
hereafter amended; which have been insured by 
the federal savings and loan insurance corpora-
tion to the extent to which the withdrawal or 
repurchasable value of such shares or accounts 
now are or may hereafter be insured by the 
federal savings and loan insurance corporation 
under the Acts of Congress of the United States 
of America now in effect or which may hereafter 
be enacted, shall be lawful. [Emphasis added] 
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